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Understanding the mind games: yet another plea to save the ABM treaty By
Leon D'souza A week after terror struck with deadly force and razed our commercial cathedrals, crippling life in our most happening city, President Bush and his men were back to mouthing their favorite line - missile defense, missile defense, missile defense. A senior U.S. official told the Washington Post Foreign Service in Moscow on September 16th that the Bush administration is prepared to press ahead with a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to build a missile defense system. "If anything, the likelihood of unilateral withdrawal has increased," the official said in response to questions about whether President Bush would still make missile defense a priority. "These incidents prove that there are people in the world for whom the concept of deterrence doesn't mean a thing. This was high-tech terrorism; these people had jet plane pilots. And if these same people had access to ballistic missiles, do you think they wouldn't have used them?" the official added, providing an insight into the administration's thinking at this crucial time. International politics, like politics in general, is about power and choice. It is also, clearly, about perceptions and misperceptions. Even the most sophisticated missile defense shield would have failed on September 11th. On that fateful day, some of our worst fears were confirmed, and then reconfirmed several times over. Terrorism is a clear and present danger to Americans today, and missile defense does not address this threat effectively. In fact, discarding the ABM Treaty will create a security dilemma, reverse the nuclear nonproliferation effort worldwide, promote international anarchy, and inflate the cost of security significantly. If we go down this road, we will create more problems than we can solve. Consider the psychological dynamics at play. It is widely understood that most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others by altering threat perception. In response to an American National Missile Defense, other nations, most notably China and Russia, will seek to enhance their own nuclear capabilities. The belief that a U.S. NMD will affect their national security is at the heart of China's anti-NMD stance. A modernized Chinese nuclear force and more robust posture will have a negative cascading effect in South Asia, triggering an arms race and a tension cycle. This will be detrimental because once a nation develops a hostile image of the other, ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image. People perceive what they expect to be present. If they think that a state is hostile, behaviors that others see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity. In a world without a sovereign, each state is protected only by its own strength. Consequently, security becomes more expensive. Missile defense is expected to cost the United States a whopping $60 billion. Poor countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, whose economy is reeling under the burden of repayments to international lending institutions, would be unable to afford the exorbitant cost of security. States like Pakistan will, most likely, be left out in the cold. Military posturing is another mind game. Although it is quite difficult to draw inferences about a state's intentions from its military posture, decision-makers often draw numerous unwarranted conclusions. They frequently assume that armament indicates aggressive intentions. This can be seen in the case of China's perspective on missile defense. Even though the U.S. has repeatedly assured the Chinese that they have not been factored into the administration's NMD calculations, China remains suspicious of America's motives. China finds it untenable that the U.S. would spend billions on a system that has only 'rogue' states in mind. The prevailing atmosphere is one of distrust and misapprehension. This climate of misunderstanding and antagonism may aggravate the existing conflict of interests. The basic security dilemma becomes overlaid by reinforcing misunderstanding as each side comes to believe that not only is the other side a potential menace, but that the other's behavior has demonstrated that it is an active enemy. There is an element of tragedy in this scenario. Both the U.S. and China share a common interest in national security. However, the structure of the situation prevents a mutually desired outcome. The shared 'real' interest of the two countries is obscured by what political scientists call 'illusory incompatibility.' In order to get past this block and develop their common interests without undue risks to their security, states must employ and build up ingenuity, trust and institutions. This is where the ABM Treaty has a role to play. The treaty is the cornerstone of a comprehensive arms control structure. Junking it will weaken nuclear stability worldwide, adding to our security concerns. It is vitally important that the administration continues to respect this instrument. Instead of squandering public money on a system of defense that will destabilize the global nuclear environment, the Bush administration should focus on the smaller but more devious types of threats - threats that terrify nations.
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