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Is the 2000 Miranda decision toothless? By
Jeremiah Stettler
It was described as one of the most important criminal law rulings in 34 years. But critics say the decision is "toothless" -- like its 1966 predecessor. In a June decision by U.S. Supreme Court, a 7-2 majority reaffirmed a 1966 ruling ordering police to inform criminal suspects of their "Miranda" rights. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, though previously a staunch opponent of Miranda's constitutionality, said in Dickerson v. United States that Miranda "has become embedded in routine practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture." Miranda v. Arizona was decided in 1966 as a hallmark of the politically unapologetic Warren Court. The decision extended the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination, requiring police to warn suspects of their rights before questioning. Thus arose the police saga rhetoric, "You have the right to remain silent. Anything you do or say may be held against you in a court of law. . . ." Two years later, Congress lashed back, passing the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. The act, known as section 3501 of the United States Code Annotated, could be construed as overruling the Supreme Court. It stated that the warnings were not necessary and that federal trial judges instead should "take into consideration all the circumstances" in determining whether a confession was voluntary. Miranda was discounted as but one step in that analysis. Until now, the U.S. government has never sought to enforce the act, according to a New York Times report, holding Miranda to be paramount. This year, Miranda was challenged by Dickerson v. United States. The case involved Charles Dickerson, a bank robbery suspect in a January 1997 incident. Shortly after his arrest, Dickerson made a voluntary confession. The catch was that he had not received his Miranda rights. At issue was whether his testimony could be included before the court. After taking the case to the Supreme Court, a 7-2 majority voted to reaffirm the 1966 Miranda ruling, excluding Dickerson's testimony from the trial. Justice Rehnquist stated further that the Crime Control Act of 1968 had encroached upon the power of the judicial branch and was invalid. "We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this court, may not be . . . overruled by an act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," Rehnquist wrote in the majority opinion. "We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts." Dissenting were Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia. They called the court's ruling "judicial arrogance" and "word games," saying the majority had sought to justify the court's authority to go beyond the scope of the Constitution. Paul Cassell, a University of Utah law professor who has sought the reversal of Miranda for more than eight years, called the decision a "tragic result," saying that the court failed to address of means of protecting a suspect's rights without using Miranda. "It's a sad day for victims of crime and law-abiding Americans," Cassel said in an interview with the Salt Lake Tribune. "The result of the court's decision will be that thousands of confessed dangerous criminals will go free whenever police have made a mistake in following the highly technical Miranda rules." Edward Lazarus, a contributing commentator to CNN Interactive, disagreed. In a June article prior to the decision, he said Miranda is not as black and white as people would suppose. "Any practitioner who has watched how Miranda determination play out during criminal trial knows that the doctrine is neither unloosing thousands of criminals onto our streets, nor protecting criminal defendants against the worst of police misconduct," Lazarus said. "In fact, in the 30-some years since Miranda was decided, our legal system has accommodated itself to Miranda, so as to make of the doctrine a surprisingly useful compromise between those extremes." But as the court has toyed with reaffirming or overruling the 1966 Miranda v. Arizona decision, legal commentators stepped forward, questioning whether the Miranda doctrine was effective. They claimed the decision had not been implemented properly, that the Legislature had failed to support the court's ruling, and that Miranda was not meeting its original intent of protecting criminals against police misconduct and abuse. Gerald Rosenberg, lecturer of law at the University of Chicago Law School, said their views are strikingly legimate. In his book, The Hollow Hope, Rosenberg made the following observation about Miranda: "While warnings appear to be given routinely, and counsel is provided, the widely shared perception is that Miranda's effect on law enforcement has been negligible." In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, critics of the judiciary claim that the ruling has had little or no impact on society. Yes, it reaffirmed Miranda, but they say law enforcement will still be able to skirt around the procedure with nothing more than a scolding in the courtroom. Even if it is used, Rosenberg said police may meet the "letter of the law, but not its spirit. "There is evidence that while the police may give the warnings, they do so in a way calculated to diminish or disparage their impact," he said. "One study found that the typical interrogator commonly defused the advice by implying that the suspect had better not exercise his rights, or delivered his statements in a formalized, bureaucratic tone to indicate that his remarks were simply a routine, meaningless legalism." Miranda was intended to deter coercive confessions, but Rosenberg said the vision is not quite as rose-colored in practical use.
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